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“Mexico‟s new President, Carlos Salinas de Gotari, has promised … that his Government 
will intensify its war against drugs into new efforts that will „make life miserable for drug 
traffickers‟” 
 
“Mexican Leader Vows Action Against Drugs” 
The New York Times 
December 12, 1988 
 
“Minutes after Mexicans learned they had elected Vicente Fox Quesada as their 
president, they watched him glare into the cameras in his first nationally broadcast 
interview and issue a sober warning to drug traffickers.   „To the criminals … they should 
know the one thing we don‟t want in Mexico is criminality, violence, drug trafficking, 
organized crime. …. To them, I say, this is the last call.‟” 
 
“Familiar Foe for Mexico‟s New Leader:  Corruption” 
The New York Times 
July 6, 2000 
 
“Since he took office on December 1, Mr. Calderon has moved against the drug cartels 
with a speed that has amazed officials in Mexico and the United States alike. … „This is a 
permanent fight, in which, unfortunately, many have lost their lives. …. We are fighting 
without rest so that these sacrifices will not be in vain.‟” 
 
“Mexico‟s Latest War on Drug Gangs Is Off to a Rapid Start” 
The New York Times 
January 27, 2007 
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Introduction 
Every six years Mexico inaugurates a new president.  Since re-election is 
unconstitutional, each presidential election involves a transition, a changing of personnel 
and policy.   Typically, a new sexenio (presidential term) begins with great promise, 
characterized by inspiring political rhetoric and vows of reform.  As the above quotes 
suggest, this pattern characterizes Mexico‟s drug policy.  For more than two decades, the 
Mexican government has pursued a war on drugs, targeting production and trafficking.  
Successive presidential administrations have entered office, promising victory.  Yet, 
despite all these efforts, narcotics and drug trafficking remain a challenge.  Some might 
even argue that narcotics and drug trafficking are even more problematic today than in 
the past.  
 
US perceptions of Mexican counter narcotics policy reveal a consistent pattern.  Since 
each administration enters office pledging policy modifications that will result in success, 
the US government greets each new sexenio with anticipation and expectations of 
victory.  By the end of the sexenio, drug trafficking and production continue, basically 
unabated, and the United States laments that the presidential administration is unable (or 
unwilling) to combat it.  The incoming administration is viewed as a savior, the key to 
winning the war on drugs.  Thus, the cycle begins anew.   
 
Currently, the United States and Mexico are at the start of a new sexenio cycle.  President 
Calderon of Mexico has renewed the government‟s efforts against drug trafficking.  The 
Bush Administration has requested new funds to assist the government of Mexico in its 
drug war.  Optimism abounds:  “The determination and commitment shown by the 
Calderon Administration is historic; and the early results impressive.” (US Department of 
State, 2007b) This was the assessment offered by the United States government as it 
unveiled the “Merida Initiative” seeking more funding to assist Mexican counter-
narcotics efforts:  “To combat the threats of drug trafficking, transnational crime, and 
terrorism in this Hemisphere, the President today is requesting $500 million as part of a 
$1.4 billion program to fund security cooperation with Mexico.”   However, a review of 
past Mexican counter narcotics efforts indicates that the program (“Plan Mexico,” as 
some dub it) is likely to have no discernible impact.   
 
Why? 
 
Both the Mexican government and the US government engage in a drug war emphasizing 
eradication, interdiction, extradition, and law enforcement.  While specific aspects of this 
policy might change, the punitive and supply-side focus remains unchanged.   Research 
suggests that the supply-side focus has limited chance for success; indeed, it frequently 
has the opposite effect.  A growing number of experts suggest that a change in strategy 
and perspective is essential (see, for instance, Robinson and Scherlen, 2007; Mares, 2006, 
Youngers and Rosin, 2004).  With demand remaining essentially unchanged, 
interruptions in supply result in increasing rewards for drug trafficking.  Likewise, 
targeting drug supplies typically results in the weeding out of less successful cartels and 
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organizations, creating a type of evolutionary process that accelerates the development of 
sophisticated and agile criminal organizations.  While officials at the Drug Enforcement 
Agency (DEA) acknowledge that “[f]or close to 30 years, trafficking organizations from 
Mexico have been adaptable, persistent, and savvy in the ways they met the changing 
drug market dynamics, first providing heroin, then marijuana, then cocaine, and now 
methamphetamine”(Constantine, 1996), the implications of this assessment are ignored.  
As long as the demand for drugs remains, supply-side efforts are doomed. 
 
Thus, the evidence suggests that -- contrary to the beliefs of the US government -- it is 
not policy implantation but rather the policy itself, which is flawed.  From this vantage 
point, it appears that no Mexican president can succeed in this war on drugs.  This makes 
continuation of a failed policy hard to fathom.  Why would Mexican presidents waste 
blood and treasure on a losing strategy?  The Mexican government, however, is not 
operating based upon a cost-benefit analysis within its own borders with regard to the 
drug war.  Drug policy in Mexico is premised upon the larger framework of US-Mexican 
relations.  From this perspective, the continuation of the failing policy is more 
understandable.  In essence, the United States does not permit Mexico to change its 
policies.  Despite research to the contrary, government documents, press reports, and 
statements demonstrate that the US government continues to believe that the failure of 
the drug war in Mexico reflects failed policy implementation, not a failed policy.  Thus, 
Mexico is trapped in a vicious cycle:  unceasing US pressure to make ever increasing 
efforts to achieve policy goals that cannot be achieved by the means utilized.   
 
A Lack of Effort or a Lackluster Policy?  Evaluating Mexico 
 
Reading US coverage of the drug war in Mexico can be a bit disconcerting.  One is rather 
forcibly reminded of the adage that history repeats itself.  Drugs and drug trafficking 
have been part of the bilateral agenda for almost a century.  And, the US approach has 
been predominantly supply-side focused.  For instance, even in the 1920s, administrators 
within the Treasury Department and the State Department “hypothesized that if producer 
countries totally prohibited drug production, then prices would become exorbitant hence 
leaving US consumers unable to purchase drugs.”  (Recio, 2002)   However, despite 
almost 100 years of policy failure, this supply-side approach has not been questioned. 
 
Most assessment of US-Mexican drug policy dates from the 1970s.  The 1960s witnessed 
a dramatic increase in US drug consumption.  The return from Southeast Asia of addicted 
soldiers, as well as growing youth usage, prompted President Nixon to declare drugs 
America‟s number one enemy in June of 1971.  Even before this, the United States had 
placed pressure upon Mexico with regard to drug trafficking.  Operation Intercept, 
launched in September, 1969, essentially closed the US-Mexican border by searching 
every person and vehicle crossing from Mexico into the United States.  For US officials, 
the “objective [wa]s to reduce and eliminate the contraband traffic into the United States 
and, ultimately, to control it at the source by eradicating the production of marijuana and 
opium poppies in Mexico.” (Craig, 1980)  Operation Condor was the Mexican 
government‟s drug policy campaign in the mid-to late 1970s.  The Mexican government 
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(with assistance from the US) sought to (1) eradicate marijuana and opium poppies; (2) 
interdict the flow of narcotics into the US; and, (3) dislocate drug trafficking 
organizations. (Toro, 1995:  18) This three pronged approach of eradication, interdiction, 
and arrest hasn‟t been fundamentally altered in the intervening decades.  Evaluations of 
Mexican counter narcotics efforts have focused on tactics, resources, and “political will”.  
The overall approach has not been questioned. 
 
US reviews of the Mexican government‟s drug war efforts take place frequently.  The US 
Department of State issues an annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.  
The US Congress has engaged in annual drug certification of Mexico.  And, the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) provides overviews of its international efforts 
and the work of cooperating states.  Furthermore, the General Accounting Office offers 
periodic assessment of US drug policy, including the cooperative efforts of allied 
countries.  These official pronouncements are supplemented by statements and testimony 
of DEA officials, ONDCP officials, and press reports. 
 
A survey of US evaluations reveals a consistent pattern.  Each new sexenio is greeted 
with hope and praise.  Subsequently, the US government identifies areas for improvement 
and requests for changes in Mexican policy.  The latter years of a presidential sexenio are 
characterized by criticism, acknowledgments of failure, and suggestions for change.  For 
instance, in the early 1980s, the administration of President de la Madrid declared that 
drug trafficking was a national security issue, eliciting praise from the United States.  
(Youngers and Rosin, 2004:  277)  Yet, by the end of the de la Madrid sexenio, US 
officials were openly stating that they did “not believe that Mexico [wa]s cooperating 
completely with drug-enforcement efforts, but they [we]re reluctant to cut off aid”  
(Roberts, 1988).  The sexenio began with a anti-corruption drive, De la Madrid‟s 
“renovación moral de la sociedad” -- moral renovation of society -- and ended being 
perceived as “el sexenio de la impunidad” - the sexenio of impunity. (Morris, 1991:  99) 
This is repeated again and again.  The United States government argued that  
 
[a] major change in Mexico‟s approach to the problems  
associated with narcotics trafficking occurred in late 1988  
with the inauguration of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari.   
The Department of State reports that President Salinas  
has elevated the threat posed by narcotics to a national  
security issue and has taken aggressive action to combat  
the narcotics problem.  (GAO, 1993:  11-12) 
 
Yet, by the end of the sexenio, Salinas‟s administration was under a cloud of suspicion.  
Rather quickly after leaving office, the Salinas family became involved in law suits and 
court cases.  The New York Times reported about a Mexican drug war official who 
testified in the United States that 
 
a major Mexican drug trafficker had told him of  
making large cash payments to Raul Salinas de Gortari  
during the presidency of Mr. Salinas's brother, Carlos.  
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Mr. Gonzalez said he relayed these allegations to  
President Salinas in 1992 and to American officials  
a year later. (Dillon, 1996) 
 
As you might now expect, the election of a new president in 1994 was accompanied by a 
change in evaluation: 
 
  US-Mexico counter-narcotics cooperation has increased  
  Substantially since the inauguration of President Zedillo in  
  December 1994, with the full range of law enforcement, 
  military, and border and drug control agencies being involved. 
  While the flow of drugs from Mexico remains high … the  
  Clinton Administration seems confident that President  
  Zedillo is committed to rooting out corruption and establishing 
  a close working relationship with the United States in this 
  area. (Storrs, 1998:  5) 
 
 
By the end of the Zedillo administration, US government assessment had soured.  The 
arrest of the head of Mexico‟s anti-narcotics program in 1997 was just the most dramatic 
event in the declining relations.  Several times the US Congress threatened to “decertify” 
Mexico due to increasing drug flows, reports of corruption, and lack of cooperation. 
 
Even the unprecedented election of an opposition politician to the presidency did not 
change this sexenio pattern.  In July 2000, for the first time since the founding of the 
party in 1929, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) did not win the presidency.  
Vicente Fox Quesada, of the Partido de Accion Nacional (PAN) won this historical 
election.  The annual State Department International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports 
in the first years of Fox‟s administration (Reports for 2002 and 2003) stated that “the 
United States and Mexico achieved unprecedented levels of cooperation in fighting drug 
trafficking”.  Yet, by 2005 the Mexican government itself was acknowledging that a 
“major drug cartel had a spy inside the office of President Vicente Fox who fed one of its 
traffickers precise information about the president's movements for more than three 
years” (McKinley, 2005)  By the end of the sexenio,  
 
the United States … openly berated Mexico for failing  
to stop a wave of drug-related violence that has taken close  
to 1,000 lives along the 2,000-mile border. The Bush  
administration … issued numerous travel advisories and  
temporarily closed its consulate in the city of Nuevo Laredo,  
which has turned into a murder capital as drug traffickers  
fight for control of lucrative routes into Texas. (Thompson, 2005) 
 
Unsurprisingly, the election of a new administration in Mexico brought was cheered by 
the US government:   
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experts on the drug trade are optimistic that [Calderon] will 
do better than Mr. Fox. They note that Mr. Calderon has 
adopted strategies that worked in Colombia in the 1990s: 
using the military to take back regions where drug dealers 
control the local authorities, extraditing top cartel members 
to the United States and eradicating crops of marijuana and 
poppies.” (McKinley, 2007) 
 
This last statement reflects another common sexenio pattern.  The United States 
frequently offers very specific recommendations for Mexican policy.  While the US has 
requested wide-ranging policy reform – such as the adoption of conspiracy laws, asset 
forfeiture procedures, and judicial restructuring – the US government has not rethought 
the basic law enforcement approach.  For instance, in one of the first reviews (GAO, 
1974), the Mexican government is praised for increased drug seizures, providing better 
information to the US about drug trafficking, and increased cooperation.  However, the 
Report noted problems such as “lack of full cooperation between the two Governments 
regarding drug information and extradition” as well as “limited technical resources and 
manpower.”  (GAO, 1974: ii)  This Report also notes that the Mexican government 
planned to “restructure the police force” in order to eliminate corruption that arose from 
poor working conditions, low pay, and a lack of benefits (GAO, 1974: 18-19).  Likewise, 
the GAO recommends that the US provide helicopters to increase the resources available 
to the Mexican government.  And, as the most recent GAO report on Mexican counter 
narcotics efforts notes, “Since 1990, NAS (Narcotics Affairs Section) has provided … 
helicopters … for transporting law enforcement personnel to interdict drug trafficking” to 
the Mexican Attorney  General‟s Office (GAO, 2007:  32).  However, the same report 
notes that the program “did not meet its target” (32) and neither the US Defense 
Department nor the Department of State‟s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs bureau would continue to fund the helicopter program.  
 
This process recurs.  The US government recommends something intended to make 
Mexican drug policy (more) successful; the Mexican government adopts the 
recommendation – sometimes quickly, other times after years; then, the recommended 
program fails to make a substantial difference.  This can be seen in various areas.  For 
instance, the United States government has argued that “[e]ffective extradition treaties 
between the United States and other countries are essential to bring illicit drug producers 
and traffickers to justice” (GAO 1988:  21) As noted in an early report, “in 1971 legal 
experts from the Departments of State and Justice went to Mexico and discussed the 
extradition problem with their Mexican counterparts.”  (GAO, 1974:  29)  Indeed, in 
1973 the GAO recommended that the Department of State should persuade the 
Government of Mexico “to honor US government requests for extradition of its citizens 
for violations of US drug laws.” (GAO, 1973:  25)  US pressure on extradition was 
consistent but progress was slow.  In 1998, in GAO testimony, the government applauded 
the fact that  
 
Mexico, with U.S. assistance, has taken steps to improve its  
capacity to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.  
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Among other things, the Mexican government has taken action  
that could potentially lead to the extradition of drug criminals to  
the United States (GAO, 1998: 1) 
 
Previously, Mexican policy and court decisions more or less prohibited the extradition of 
Mexican nationals wanted for crimes committed abroad; rather, these people were to be 
prosecuted in Mexico.  However, the Zedillo Administration broke new ground by 
extraditing seven Mexican nationals and one dual U.S.-Mexican national to the United 
States between 1996 and 2000.  By the time of the Fox Administration, extraditions of 
Mexican citizens were increasingly taking place.  Yet, this policy adoption has yet to 
substantially reduce drug trafficking into the United States from Mexico, as the title of 
the most recent GAO report on Mexican counternarcotics reveals:  “US Assistance Has 
Helped Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts, but Tons of Illicit Drugs Continue to Flow 
into the United States”.  (GAO, 2007)   Indeed, one could argue that drug trafficking 
from Mexico is worst now, after more than three decades of US assistance. 
 
US government requests, Mexican government adopts, and the drug war continues to fail.  
US advice encompasses the whole scope of drug war tactics.  The Mexican government – 
typically at the behest of the US government – has engaged in significant police reform 
over the years.  New bureaus have been created, old one consolidated, and the US 
government enlisted in recruitment, screening, and training of Mexican drug enforcement 
officials.  Despite the involvement of the US, police corruption continues to plague 
Mexico at the federal and local level: 
 
Some agents of Mexico's Federal Investigative Agency (AFI) 
are believed to work as enforcers for the Sinaloa cartel, and the 
Attorney General's Office (PGR) reported in December 2005 
that one-fifth of its officers are under investigation for criminal 
activity. The PGR reported in late 2005 that nearly 1,500 of 
AFI's 7,000 agents were under investigation for suspected 
criminal activity and 457 were facing charges.  … the Mexican 
federal government conducted purges and prosecution of police 
forces in Nuevo Laredo; Apatzingan, Michoacán; and, Tijuana, 
Baja California. … Federal officers arriving in Nuevo Laredo 
were fired on by municipal police leading to the arrest of 41 
municipal police and the suspension of the entire 700-member 
Nuevo Laredo police force to investigate corruption. (Cook, 
2007:  9-10) 
 
However, the US government continues to be confident that police corruption can be 
eradicated with the appropriately tough policies.  As might be expected, the new sexenio 
is seen as an opportunity for success: 
 
In June 2007, President Calderón purged 284 federal police 
commanders, including federal commanders of all 31 states 
and the federal district. These commanders were suspended 
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and subjected to drug and polygraph tests. The Mexican 
government immediately named replacements for the 284 
dismissed commanders. The new commanders all 
successfully passed an array of examinations designed to 
weed out corrupt officers, including financial checks, drug 
testing, and psychological and medical screening. These 
tests are to be repeated on a regular basis.  (Cook, 2007:  
10) 
 
A staggeringly long list of policy changes has been proffered by the United States.  These 
recommendations include the development of money laundering laws, asset forfeiture 
provisions, “kingpin” targeting strategy, as well as greater reliance on the military.  (See, 
for instance, Constantine, 1996 for an example of the changes the United States viewed 
as critical for success in Mexico.)    From the perspective of the United States, it was 
“very important that the Mexican government expeditiously enact similar legislation to 
afford their law enforcement agencies adequate laws and legal authority to successfully 
investigate and prosecute major drug traffickers.”  (Constantine, 1996)  Yet, the adoption 
of these measures and the multiple reforms of the Mexican law enforcement agencies 
have not resulted in success.  After bowing to US requests to screen Mexican officials 
working for Mexican law enforcement agencies, the United States reported that “[w]ith 
the Mexican Vetted Unit Program entering its third year, it was mutually recognized that 
the program had not achieved the level of effectiveness originally envisioned.”  
(Department of State, INCSR 1999)   
 
A review of US assessment of Mexican drug enforcement reveals contradictory advice.  
For instance, the United States at times encourages the involvement of the Mexican 
military in counter narcotics efforts.  Moves in 1995 were welcomed by the United 
States: 
 
Mexican and American officials said that during the last two 
months, army generals have taken part more extensively in a 
redesign of the Government's drug-control strategy. … "In 
the past, there was always a reluctance to allow the military 
to play a stronger role," a United States official said today. 
'But with the Zedillo administration, that mindset has 
dissolved." (Golden, 1995) 
 
The US continues to foster a militarization of the drug war in Mexico.  In early October 
2007, Mexico's Deputy Foreign Minister for North American Affairs, Carlos Rico, 
announced that the United States would provide $1 billion in military assistance to 
combat drug cartels. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Western 
Hemisphere, Stephen Johnson “noted that the aid program would be a „historic‟ 
opportunity to improve U.S.-Mexico relations and cooperation.” (Cook, 2007:  16-17)  
Yet, in 1997 the US government expresses doubts about the “wisdom of President 
Ernesto Zedillo‟s policy of entrusting more and more of the drug war to the armed 
forces”  (Preston, 1997)  This skepticism seemed warranted after the arrest of the head of 
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Mexico‟s anti-narcotics program, General Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo. Yet, the United States 
in its most recent program (the Merida Initiative) lauds the Mexican military as “better 
suited to interdict drug shipments” than the Mexican police.  (Roig-Franzia, 2007)  Such 
contradictions doesn‟t even take into consideration the stinging critique of militarization 
of the drug war by non-US government entities (see, for instance, Freeman, 2002 and 
2006). 
 
While the pattern of US evaluation of Mexican counter narcotics is clear, what about the 
war on drugs?  What does the evidence suggest with regard to the success of Mexico‟s 
war on drugs?  The amount of data available for analysis is tremendous.  One can view 
information about arrests, seizures, and extradition.  On the following pages are graphical 
representations of the Mexican war on drugs in all of these areas.  Several interesting 
conclusions can be drawn.  However, it is important to begin with a caveat well 
expressed in a Congressional Research Service report: 
 
Caution should be exercised in considering the changes in the 
various areas as an indication of Mexico‟s seriousness in 
controlling drug trafficking. The trends may also be affected 
by the demand for the drugs, the amount of drugs produced 
or available, the sophistication of the drug traffickers, the 
intelligence and capabilities of Mexican counter-drug 
agencies, the effectiveness of reporting and monitoring 
methods, the effect of weather conditions on eradication 
efforts, and competition from alternative drug suppliers. 
(Storrs, 2001:  3) 
 
 
Comparing US verbal evaluations to the annual evidence of arrests, seizures, and 
extradition is instructive.  Overall, there is some variation between and within sexenios.  
On the whole, though, it does not follow US rhetoric.  A comparison of trend lines versus 
moving averages suggests that the year to year focus of US evaluations misses the larger 
picture.  For example, while arrests can vary from year to year, the overall trend is flat. 
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Mexican Drug Arrests, 1988-2006
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Figure 1:  Data from Department of State International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports; trend 
line and moving average calculated by author. 
 
Some data that initially seems promising can actually be disappointing.  Figure 2, 
detailing marijuana seizures, shows a steady upward trend from 1988 to 2006.  However, 
one of the earliest objectives of the United States has been to “[c]onvince the Mexican 
government to reorder its priorities to give top and predominant attention to „hard‟ drugs 
rather than marihuana (sic)” (GAO, 1974:  14)  Thus, the data suggests that the US has 
been unable to achieve this objective – especially when compared to other seizure data. 
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Marijuana Seizures 1988-2006
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Figure 2:  Data from Department of State International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports; trend 
line and moving average calculated by author 
 
Seizures of Cocaine, 1988-2006
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Figure 3:  Data from Department of State International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports; trend 
line and moving average calculated by author 
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Seizure of Heroin, 1988-2006
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Figure 4:  Data from Department of State International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports; trend 
line and moving average calculated by author 
 
Despite annual variation, the trend for cocaine seizures is down (or flat, at best).  Heroin 
seizures are trending upwards, though.  However, the United States emphasizes that 
cocaine trafficking is the critical focus of US anti-drug efforts:  as noted in the latest 
available INCSR, about 90% of all cocaine consumed in the United States comes via 
Mexico  Thus, the failure to interdict suggests limited impact on cocaine supplied here in 
the United States.  Increasingly, the US has also concentrated upon methamphetamines.  
The United States government recently noted that there has been a “shift of the 
manufacture and trafficking of methamphetamine and its precursors into Mexico” 
(Department of State, INCSR 2007).  As Figure 5 shows, Mexican seizures have been 
increasing over time.  However, at present, Mexico is not the major source of 
methamphetamine for the United States, thus calling into question how effective Mexican 
interdiction of methamphetamine is for supply disruption in the United States.   
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Methamphetamine Seizures, 1994-2006
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
S
al
in
as
Ze
di
llo
Ze
di
llo
Ze
di
llo
Ze
di
llo
Ze
di
llo
Ze
di
llo
Fo
x
Fo
x
Fo
x
Fo
x
Fo
x
Fo
x
Sexenio
K
il
o
g
ra
m
 o
f 
M
e
th
a
m
p
h
e
ta
m
in
e
 
Figure 5:  Data from Department of State International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports; trend 
line and moving average calculated by author 
 
 
Extradition From Mexico, 1996-2006
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Figure 6:  Data from Department of State International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports; trend 
line and moving average calculated by author 
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Extradition is clearly increasing.  As of yet, though, there has been no impact upon the 
drug trafficking.  Indeed, in a recent report to Congress, it was stated that “[t]he National 
Drug Intelligence Center now considers Mexican drug cartels as dominating the U.S. 
illicit drug market.”  (Cook, 2007:  4)  While data about drug flows are not as 
documented as arrests, seizures, and extradition, the United States noted that Mexico was 
the principal transit route for South American cocaine, with an estimated “50 to 70 
percent of the cocaine smuggled into the U.S.” transiting through Mexico in 1993 (State 
Department, 1993 INCSR) By 2006, that figure had increased, not decreased. The latest 
report asserts that 90% of the cocaine flowing into the US comes through Mexico.   
 
While there have been minor variations, the overall trend in cocaine prices and purity 
suggests that counternarcotics efforts are not having the intended effect.  Data compiled 
by the Washington Office on Latin America data suggests that the trend for price and 
purity is opposite of what the counter narcotic policy seeks.   
 
US Retail Prices of Cocaine and Crack 
 
Figure 7:  Reprinted from Walsh, 2004:  4 
 
The data with regard to price and purity is especially important.  Increasing price and 
decreasing purity are supposed to lead to reduced drug consumption.  This is the logic of 
a supply-side approach.  If, as this data suggests, prices are declining and purity is 
unaffected, then the supply-side process is not working as hypothesized. 
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Purity of Retail Cocaine, Crack, and Heroin 
 
Figure 8:  Reprinted from Walsh, 2004:  5 
 
 
 
Implications of US Rhetoric and Counternarcotics Evidence 
 
Listening to the United States government, one might think that a change in personnel, 
accompanied by changes in law could be the key to drug war success in Mexico.  A long 
term study of US government evaluations, though, indicates that this is not the case.  
Since the GAO report in 1974, almost every demand by the US with regard the Mexican 
counternarcotics policy has been adopted.  Law enforcement agencies have been 
restructured, recruited, screened, and trained by the United States.  Conspiracy laws have 
been passed, as have asset forfeiture rules.  Increasingly, the Mexican military has been 
brought into the fight against drugs.  In many ways, Mexico has mirrored efforts 
undertaken within the United States to fight drugs.  Yet, to date, taking US advice has not 
translated into success. 
 
For some, this failure was anticipated.  If one places drug trafficking into a framework of 
political economy rather than social deviance, the flaws of a supply-side approach are 
clear.  (See Mares, 2006, especially Chapter 2 for a discussion of the impact of analytical 
perspectives on policy development, implementation, and assessment.)  Writing almost 
two decades ago, Milton Friedman predicted that a supply-side, punitive, law 
enforcement approach would not work: 
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Of course the problem is demand, but it is not only demand, 
it is demand that must operate through repressed and illegal 
channels. Illegality creates obscene profits that finance the 
murderous tactics of the drug lords; illegality leads to the 
corruption of law enforcement officials; illegality 
monopolizes the efforts of honest law forces so that they are 
starved for resources to fight the simpler crimes of robbery, 
theft and assault.   Drugs are a tragedy for addicts. But 
criminalizing their use converts that tragedy into a disaster 
for society, for users and non-users alike. Our experience 
with the prohibition of drugs is a replay of our experience 
with the prohibition of alcoholic beverages. (Friedman, 1989) 
 
In essence, the drug war seeks to overturn the law of supply and demand.  And, the 
evidence suggests that it has not been able to achieve this.  Thus, the political willingness 
of Mexican leaders should not be called into question.  Rather, the US should recognize 
that politics is the art of the possible.  Thus, Mexican leaders may only find it possible to 
punish past behaviors rather than prevent new ones from arising.  Corruption can be 
tackled only after the fact; the economics of the situation suggest that it cannot be 
prevented.   
 
The prognosis for the Calderon sexenio, based on the pattern, is as follows.  President 
Calderon will garner great support in the United States for his tough stance against drugs.  
Over the six years, though, drug cartels will adapt to the situation, establish new routines, 
and finesse the new situation.  Even if drug trafficking diminishes in Mexico (as it did in 
the Caribbean in the late 1980s), the evidence suggests that the flow will be diverted 
through a new path, not eliminated.  Already there is some evidence to suggest that the 
Caribbean is re-emerging as a key transit zone, thanks to the increased emphasis on the 
US-Mexico border.  Thus, no one should be surprised that at present the US government 
asserts that  
 
When President Calderon came into office, he made clear 
that the fight against organized crime was a priority. To 
date his actions have spoken even more loudly and 
underscore his determination and dedication to success in 
this fight. (Department of State, 2007a). 
 
Likewise, no one should be surprised if the US government‟s assessment in 2011 reflects 
disappointment with the achievements of the Calderon administration and sincere hopes 
that a new administration will prove to be more effective. 
 
The evidence suggests that it is the policy itself, not its implementation, which is flawed.  
Is there evidence that underlying policy will change?   
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At present, the evidence is contradictory.  Within Mexico, there are loud voices, which 
have been speaking out over the years, critical of the US approach to the drug war.  
Frequently, the Mexican president himself joins in the criticism.  This has occurred in 
every presidential sexenio -- Salinas, Zedillo, Fox, and even Calderon (see, for instance, 
Cook, 2007:  16-17). In Mexico, under the Fox Administration, the government 
attempted to merge the US-style punitive drug ware approach with European harm 
reduction approach.  The Mexican Congress debated and approved legislation for drug 
use decriminalization.  The effort was touted as a way to be more effective in the drug 
war but concentrating efforts on violent, drug trafficking offenders.  For student of US – 
Latin American relations, the sequence of events that then transpired were very 
instructive.  Initially, it appeared that the legislation would become law; Congress had 
passed it easily and President Fox was expected to sign it into law.  After all, the law had 
been offered to the legislature from the president‟s office and had been introduced onto 
the floor by his own political party, PAN.  However, just a day after President Fox had 
publically stated he would sign the legislation, President Fox returned the legislation to 
Congress, requesting that the legislation should be amended to make drug possession and 
use illegal.  What accounts for this dramatic turn of events?  Observers noted the role of 
the United States in this policy reversal: 
 
… US embassy spokesperson Judith Bryan said US officials had 
"urged Mexican representatives to review the legislation urgently, 
to avoid the perception that drug-use would be tolerated in Mexico, 
and to prevent drug tourism".  (BBC News, 2006) 
 
This can be viewed as a template for what any Mexican government would face if it 
attempts any autonomous efforts to alter drug policy:  quick, severe, and concrete 
pressure by the United States to return to US-approved policies.  Given the overwhelming 
role played by the United States in Mexico – which has only deepened in the post-
NAFTA era – the chances of Mexico successfully resisting the United States are slim. 
 
Thus, until the United States itself rethinks its punitive drug enforcement policy, it seems 
that Mexican sexenios are doomed to “bright beginnings” with “failed finales” in its drug 
war. 
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